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INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the power of CRISPR-the workhorse genetic-editing 
system first elucidated in 2012-and the public's interest in it, both as a piece of 
science and an ethical battleground.1 But there has also been extensive interest in the 
variety of intellectual property issues surrounding CRISPR, including a heated patent 
dispute between two of the technology's originators, Jennifer Doudna (UC Berkeley) 
and Emmanuelle Charpentier (Max-Planck), on one side, and Feng Zhang (Broad In-
stitute) on the other.2 While the intellectual property disputes concerning CRISPR are 
far from over-indeed, like Tolstoy's War and Peace, new characters central to the dis-
pute continue to materialize3 -five years of hindsight has given some perspective on 
their ethical, legal, and social implications. 
This brief essay reviews several of these issues: ( i) difficulties with interinstitutional 
collaborations, especially for lucrative 'translational' technologies; (ii) the rise of for-
profit 'surrogate' companies to manage university licensing; and (iii) the use of patents 
as a means of private governance to prevent potential abuses, such as 'gene drives', 
See eg Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT TECH. REv., Mar. 5, 2015, 
https:/ /www.technologyreview.com/s/ 535661/ engineering-the-perfect-baby/ [https:/ /perma.cc/ AT7T-
FM8Y] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing public perceptions of CRISPR); see generally CRISPR-CAS: A 
LABORATORY MANUAL (Jennifer Doudna & Prashant Mali eds., 2016) (teaching the method of using CRISPR 
for gene editing). 
See eg Jacob S. Sherkow, What the CRISPR Patent Dispute Is All About, Sci. AM., Dec. 12, 2016, 
https: / /blogs.scientificamerican.com/ guest-blog/ what-the-crispr-patent-dispute-is-all-about/ [https: / / 
perma.cc/BA88-VUEN] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (synopsizing the CRISPR patent dispute). 
See Jon Cohen, CRISPRPatent Battle in Europe Takes a 'Wild' Twist with Surprising Player, Science News, Aug. 4, 
2017, http:/ /www.sciencemag.org/ news/2017 /08/ crispr-patent-battle-europe-takes-wild-twist-surprising-
player [https:/ /perma.cc/SZG3-CHRB J (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (describing a new, fundamental CRIS PR 
patent in Europe owned by Millipore Sigma). 
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law, 
Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ 4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distri-
bution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that 
the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@loup.com 
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seed-saving restrictions for agriculture, and germ-line human engineering. It concludes 
with several observations-and prescriptive recommendations-for patent protection 
related to academic, collaborative1 cutting-edge research. 
THE CRISPR PATENT DISPUTE 
Since the first U.S. patent applications were filed for an engineerable CRISPR sys-
tem in 20121 the IP landscape has become significantly more crowded1 with sev-
eral researchers controlling a few significant battlements. To date1 three groups of 
scientists have emerged as holders of foundational patents covering CRISPR-Cas9: 
Jennifer Doudna (UC Berkeley) and Emmanuelle Charpentier (now at Max-Planck1 
but at Umea University1 Sweden, at the time of her contribution to the invention) 1 
Feng Zhang (Broad Institute)1 and Virginijus Sik8nys (Vilnius University, Lithuania). 
Contrary to popular belie£ Sikfoys was the first of the three to file a patent applica-
tion covering his variation on the technology. Sik8nys filed for his patent on March 
201 2012,4 although it did not issue-that is1 it was not formally granted by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.0.)-until May 21 2017.5 For a number of 
reasons, Sikfoys' contributions-both to the science CRISPR and the technology's 
patent dispute-have been overlooked.6 But SikSnys' patent covers using CRISPR-
Cas9 through an in vitro1 pre-assembled Cas9: RNA complex-also known as CRISPR 
ribonucleoproteins-an important iteration of the technology for a variety of applica-
tions.7 
More famously1 Doudna and Charpentier first filed their fundamental patent ap-
plication covering CRISPR-Cas9 on May 251 2012.8 Their original patent application 
contained over 150 claims-particular ways to practice the invention that defined 
the application's boundaries-and was notably unspecific with respect to cell type.9 
Nonetheless1 Doudna and Charpentier's patent attorneys pegged their clients' inven-
tion broadly1 as the use of a single-guide RNA to mediate the editing of genomic D NA. 10 
It was the ease1 flexibility, and precision of this advance that has largely thrust CRIS PR 
into the lay lexicon. 11 
4 U.S. Patent Application No. 61/613,373 (filed Mar. 20, 2012). 
U.S. Patent No. 9,637, 739. 
6 See Sarah Zhang, The Battle over Genome Editi11g Gets Science All Wrong, WIRED, Oct. 4, 2015, 
https: / /www.wired.com/2015/ 10 /battle-genome-editing-gets-science-wrong/ [https:/ /perma.cc/R2 J 5-
LKHT] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (expanding on Sik5nys as the 'forgotten' CRISPRscientist). 
7 See egJe Wook Woo, et al., DNA-Free Genome Editing in Plants with Preassembled CRISPR-Cas9 Ribonucleo-
proteins, 33 NAT. BIOTECH. 1162 (2015) (using the technology in plants). 
8 U.S. Patent Application No. 61/652,086 (filed May 25, 2012). 
9 See Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPRPatent Interference Showdown ls On: How Did We Get Here and What Comes 
Next?, STAN. CTR. L. B1osc1. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2015, https://law.stanford.edu/2015/12/29/the-crispr-patent-
interference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-here-and-what-comes-next/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WZB-2L44 J (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (summarizing the claims). 
10 See Jacob S. Sherkow, Biotech Trial of the Century Could Determine W110 Owns CRISPR, MIT TECH. REv., Dec. 
7, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/ s/ 603034/biotech-trial-of-the-century-could-determine-who-
owns-crispr / [https:/ / perma.cc/3KUU-PD92) (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (recounting Doudna' s attorney's 
argument before the U.S.P.T.O.). 
11 See Megan Molteni, CRISPR May Cure All Genetic Disease-One Day, WIRED, June 7, 2017, 
https:/ / www.wired.com/2017 / 06/ crispr-may-cure-genetic-disease-one-day/ [https:/ / perma.cc/ Q273-
PWGF] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (explaining the importance of CRISPR to a lay audience). 
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During the pendency of Doudna and Charpentier's application in the USA, Zhang 
also filed a U.S. patent application-directed specifically to eukaryotic applications of 
CRISPR-Cas9. 12 The principal improvement of Zhang' s methods over his predeces-
sors was the use of a nuclear localization signal and, separately, codon optimization to 
natively express Cas9 .13 But Zhang' s attorneys fast tracked his application through the 
U.S.P.T.0., a relatively expensive and strategically risky process.14 As a consequence, 
Zhang' s patent-even though it was filed after applications from Doudna, Charpentier, 
and Sikfays-was issued first in the USA.15 That quandary gave rise to the now-famous 
patent dispute in the USA, the first round of which was won by Zhang.16 The remainder 
of it is still being appealed; a decision is expected in late 2018.17 
The U.S. interference decision, however, stands apart from the rest of the world. As 
detailed-excellently-by Knut J0rgen Egelie and his colleagues at Norwegian Uni-
versity of Science and Technology-the global CRISPR patent landscape is varied.18 
Europe has now officially sided with Doudna and Charpentier over Zhang, although 
opposition proceedings at the European Patent Office have just begun.19 And China, 
too, recently sided with Doudna and Charpentier.20 These conflicting decisions are fur-
ther complicated by a set of interlocking license agreements from the inventors' biotech 
companies, with a great deal of uncertainty playing out in the global commercial sec-
tor for CRISPR 21 Unraveling those agreements, and the issues raised by the patenting 
of the technology in the first instance, speaks volumes about the values and pitfalls of 
patents in the research enterprise. 
INTERINSTITUTI ONAL CO LLAB 0 RATION 
One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and large, a dis-
pute between academic research institutions. It pits lawyers representing the University 
12 See U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (noting a provisional application date ofDec. 12, 2012). 
13 Id. ('The invention comprehends the expression of two or more gene products being altered and the vectors of 
the system further comprising one or more nuclear localization signal( s) (NLS( s) ) .... The invention further 
comprehends the Cas9 protein being codon optimized for expression in the eukaryotic cell.'). 
14 Petition to Make Special Under Accelerated Examination Program, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/054,414 
(Oct. 15, 2013). 
15 Compare U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (Zhang's issued patent) with U.S. Patent Application No. 13/842,859 
(Doudna and Charpentier's patent application); see also Jacob S. Sherkow, 'Die CRJSPR Patent Interference 
Showdown Is On: How Did We Get Here and What Comes Next?, STAN. CTR. L. & B1osc1. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2015, 
https: I /law.stanford.edu/2015/12/29 / the-crispr-patent-interference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-here-
and-what-comes-next/ [https:/ /perma.cc/7WZB-2L44 J (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (explaining the genesis of 
the dispute). 
16 Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
17 Kevin E. Noonan, Berkeley Files Opening Brief in CRJSPR Appeal, PATENT Docs, July 31, 2017, 
http:/ /www.patentdocs.org/2017 /07 /berkeley-files-opening-brief-in-crispr-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/ 
57GX-8UMX] (accessedNov.13,2017). 
18 KnutJ. Egelie et al., The Emerging Patent Landscape of CRJSPR-Cas Gene Editing Technology, 34 NAT. BIOTECH. 
1025, 1025 (2016). 
19 European Patent No. 2,800,811 (filed Mar. 15, 2013); see also Sharon Begley, University of California's 
CRJSPR Patent Win in Europe Likely to Be Challenged, STAT NEWS, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.statnews. 
com/2017 /03/28/ crispr-university-of-california-patent/ [https:/ /perma.cc/E8ZB-Q4FF] (accessed Nov. 
13, 2017) (reporting on upcoming challenges). 
2° Chinese Patent No. 104,854,241. 
21 Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRJSPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698, 
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of California against lawyers representing the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard.22 
To be sure, university rivalries are common.23 But because universities share among 
themselves a larger mission to create and disseminate knowledge to the public, litigious-
ness among them has been historically rare. 24 
University-against-university patent disputes, like CRISPR, complicate interinsti-
tutional research agreements on several levels. First, they have the potential to chill 
formal interinstitutional research collaborations among universities if the institutions 
cannot agree on intellectual property issues beforehand.25 Universities may simply be 
unwilling to enter into such agreements in the first instance, or, perhaps more perni-
ciously, discourage their faculty from informally developing such networks. 26 While the 
empirical evidence for such a diminishment in collaborative efforts is slight-difficult 
to demonstrate, in part, because it requires the proof of opportunities not taken by 
universities-some recent survey data have found that 'institutionally mandated [ma-
terials transfer agreements J put sand in the wheels of a lively system of intra-disciplinary 
exchanges of research tools'.27 Aside from this, there is substantial anecdotal evidence 
of institutional difficulties in creating such agreements.28 It stands to reason that, at 
least in some instances, these difficulties have ended some collaborations before they 
could begin. More immediately, this is a current issue with the CRISPR patent dispute 
given some internal dissention between Doudna and Charpentier' s respective institu-
tions concerning the intellectual property involved. Although Doudna and Charpen-
tier filed their joint patent application in 2012, their institutions did not formally assent 
to a cross-licensing agreement until December 2016.29 If assenting to a cross-licensing 
22 See Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657 415 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
23 See eg GREG EMMANUEL, THE 100-YARD WAR: INSIDE THE 100-YEAR-OLD MICHIGAN-OHIO STATE FOOTBALL 
RIVALRY (2005) (writing on the historic rivalry between the University of Michigan and The Ohio State Uni-
versity) . 
24 See JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 122 (2016) (examining university patent 
prosecution and assertion). 
25 Jacob S. Sherkow, Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172, 173 (2016) . 
26 Id. 
27 Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D. Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protec-
tion for Biological Research, 27 NAT. BIOTECH. 36, 36 (2009). 
28 See eg GideonD. Markman et al., Innovation Speed: Transferring University Technology to Market, 34 REs. POLY 
1058, 1064 (2005) (' [ C ]ross-university collaborations . ... may introduce another layer of complexity to 
licensing and thus add time to the transfer process. This raises a question about the tradeoffs between the 
value of insights derived from inter-university collaboration and the costs incurred due to licensing complex-
ity.'); Mel I. Mendelson & Mark Rajai, Students Patents 011 Inter-University Projects, PROC. AM. Soc'y ENG'R 
EDUC. ANN. CONF. & EXPOSITION 6.904.1, 6.904.1- 6.904.2 (2001) (describing the difficulties in establish-
ing a patent agreement for student projects between Loyola Marymount University and East Tennessee State 
University); Dianne Nicol & Jane L. Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Is-
sues Facing the Australian Industry, CENTRE FOR LAW AND GENETICS OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 6 105 (2003 ), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2583508 [https://perma.cc/W978-583Q] (describing interinstitutional IP ten-
sions among Australian universities) . But see Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence a11d A11ecdotes: A11 Analysis 
of Huma 11 Gene Patwting Controversies, 24 NAT. BIOTECH. 1091, 1093 (2006) ('Finally, the data concerning 
the increasing secrecy of university researchers seem to indicate that there may be a conflation of patenting 
and commercial and/ or scientific competition as the cause of this trend. It appears that academic researchers 
are becoming more secretive, but that is not shown to be attributable to the patenting process, suggesting that 
the solution might not reside in modifying patent policy.') . 
29 CRISPR Therapeutics, Intellia Therapeutics, Caribou Biosciences and ERS Genomics A11nou11ce Global 
Agreement 011 the Fou11datio11al In tellectual Property for CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Editing Technology, 
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agreement for a single piece of technology has proved difficult, it is unclear how the two 
institutions will deal with one another on future collaborations. 
Second, even with some friction between universities over obtaining patents for 
their researchers' work, it has been rare for universities to sue one another regarding 
inventorship-until now. In 2011, for instance, the University of Utah sued the Max-
Plancklnstitute concerning inventorship over a foundational group of patents concern-
ing RNA interference technology.30 And since 2012, Stanford University and the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong have battled one another over lucrative patent rights 
to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnostics.31 That dispute-despite several rounds of 
appeals-is still ongoing.32 Such patent disputes are costly, high stakes, and high pro-
file. And while the CRISPR patent dispute itself is not a cause of such conflict, it has 
become emblematic-and potentially prophetic-of the tenor of such disputes today. 
Avoiding them in the first instance is a sensible institutional priority. But that some-
times comes at the cost of avoiding one's colleagues.33 
Third, even apart from the administrative institutional level, patent disputes like 
these damper the culture of scientific collaboration, clearly something of tremendous 
import to modem science. 34 Putting a price on a loosely defined culture of scientific col-
laboration is difficult-its loss is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, many of the most 
significant breakthroughs of the past century arose in part from a culture of scientific 
openness and collegiality.35 Abandoning that in favor of inuring patent rights to re-
searchers from a single institution seems, at best, unwise. Relatedly, it may erode scien-
tists' penchant for honest, if critical assessments, of their own work among collaborators 
and colleagues. A key piece of evidence used in the U.S. CRISPR patent interference 
against the University of California was a single one of Doudna' s public statements that 
her collaborators 'weren't sure if CRIS PR/ Cas9 would work in eukaryotes-plant and 
animal cells'. 36 That statement has now echoed throughout laboratories across the USA 
as a cautionary tale against critical reflections of one's work- at least while patents are 
pending.37 
CARIBOU B1osc1., Dec. 16, 2016, http://cariboubio.com/in-the-news/press-releases/ crispr-therapeutics-
intellia-therapeutics-caribou-biosciences-and-ers [https:/ / perma.cc/ T6H G-P6DB]. 
30 Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 851 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
31 Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, 860 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
32 Id. 
33 Johan Bruneel, Pablo D'Este & Ammon Salter, Investigating the Factors That Diminish the Barriers to University-
Industry Collaboration, 39 REs. PoL'Y 858, 859- 60 (2010) (noting that IP conflicts act as a barrier to collabo-
ration). 
34 See Sherkow, supra note 25, at 173. 
35 See eg Clyde A. Hutchison, III, DNA Sequencing: Bench to Bedside and Beyond, 35 NUCLEIC Acrns REs. 6227, 
6230 (2007) (describing the collaboration to engineer DNA sequencing between Maxam and Gilbert); E.M. 
Tansey & P .P. Catterall, Monoclonal Antibodies: A Witness Seminar in Contemporary Medical History, 38 MED. 
HIST. 322, 327 ( 1994) (describing the collaborative efforts of the discovery of antibodies); James D. Watson 
& Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 FASEB]. 8, 9 (1991 ) (discussing the 
collaborative efforts of the Human Genome Project). 
36 Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
37 Michael Eisen, Pateuts Are Destroying the Soul of Scirnce, IT Is NOT JUNK (Feb. 20, 2017), 
http://www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p= l981 [https://perma.cc/ 2VME-PUS8] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) 
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Lastly, patent conflicts' hindrance of interinstitutional collaborations may simply 
be costly. Today, some research benefits from economies of scale, such as where 
expensive equipment can be shared among institutions.38 The New York Genome Cen-
ter, for example, is a joint venture among several New York-area research institutions: 
NYU, Columbia, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories, to name a few. 39 This arrangement 
allows researchers at these institutions to share a fleet of Illumina X Ten sequencers, 
the total cost of which-including operations-runs into the millions of US dollars.40 
Where research funding is diminishing-as is sadly the case in much of the Anglophone 
world41 -universities may foolishly hesitate to engage in similar cost-saving arrange-
ments in the short-sighted hope of avoiding future patent lawsuits.42 One would hope 
that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn't warranted. 
SURROGATE LICENSING 
Interinstitutional tensions aside, the CRISPR patent dispute raises some signifi-
cant issues concerning patent licensing and commercialization-agreements between 
universities and commercial entities over the use and development of CRISPR 
In CRISPR's case, both the Broad Institute and the University of California have 
employed a system of 'surrogate licensing': 'outsourc[ing] the licensing and com-
mercialization of a valuable patent portfolio to a private company'.43 It is that 
company-rather than university-that takes responsibility for licensing the included 
patents to commercial researchers, including biotech startups and large pharmaceutical 
developers. 44 
At the same time, the surrogate is frequently working to develop the technology it-
self.45 This is certainly true for CRISPR The University of California has delegated the 
entirety of its licensing rights to Doudna' s inventions to Caribou Biosciences, which 
in turn has granted an exclusive license to develop human therapies to Intellia Ther-
apeutics.46 The Broad Institute, meanwhile, has employed Editas Medicine as its sur-
rogate for human therapeutics; the institute retains control over non-commercial and 
('But this [was J an absolutely true statement that any good scientist would say even if they believed CRlSPR 
would work in eukaryotic cells .... Is this the lesson we really want to learn from CRlSPR? That scientists 
working in fields with commercial potential should never speak honestly about their work and the scientific 
process?'). 
38 Karla Hernandez-Villafuerte et al.1 Economies of Scale and Scope in Publicly Funded Biomedical and Health Re-
search: Evidence from the Literature, 15 HEALTH R.Es. POLY & SYS. 3 ( 2017) (reviewing the sometimes conflicting 
evidence for economies of scale in biomedical research). 
39 Institution Founding Members, NEW YORK GENOME CENTER, http://www.nygenome.org/about-us/#our_ 
members [https:/ /perma.cc/ AVA6-9NNA] (accessed Nov. 131 2017). 
40 The New York Genome Center Purchases Illumina Hiseq X Ten Sequencing System, NEW YORK GENOME CENTER, 
Jan. 221 20141 http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/HiSeq-X-Ten-NYGC-Press-Release-FINAL 
.pdf; [https://perma.cc/G4KZ-6EAF] Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer's IP, 96 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 14-16), https:/ /papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstracLid=2928241 (discussing the cost 
of sequencing operations). 
41 See Simon Parkin, Brexit Is Quietly Strangling Science, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 81 2017, https:/ /www.bloomberg. 
com/news/features/2017-08-08/brexit-guts-british-science-and-risks-graphene-innovation [https:/ / 
perma.cc/9VD9-WVNV] (accessed Nov. 131 2017). 
42 See Sherkow, supra note 25, at 173; RooKSBY, supra note 24 1 at 126. 
43 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21 1 at 698. 
44 Id. at 698-99. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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non-human therapyuses.47 Surrogates, therefore,' control a large and lucrative field for 
the exploitation of the licensed technology, and have significant freedom both to exploit 
it themselves and seek partners and sublicenses'.48 
This system of surrogate licensing-while not unique to CRISPR-sets up several 
obvious conflicts. Surrogates may very well be unwilling to sub license their technology 
to smaller biotech companies-who, in a very real sense, are rivals to the surrogate.49 
Smaller companies seeking to develop similar uses of CRISPR to that studied by, say, 
Editas are unlikely to receive patent licenses to do so-at least on favorable terms.so 
Surrogates are also not invested with the same public duty as their related academic 
institutions. Their duties, especially if they are publicly traded companies-as are Edi-
tas, Intellia, and Emmanuelle Charpentier' sown company, CRISPR Therapeutics-are 
to their shareholders.s1 In both real and legal terms, this duty tacks toward profit 
maximization rather than, say, advancing scientific knowledge or public access to the 
downstream products of their research-ideals typically lauded by research institu-
tions. s2 With respect to this conflict between public-facing goals and shareholder value, 
Michael Eisner, former CEO of Disney, put it best: 'We have no obligation to make 
history. We have no obligation to make art. We have no obligation to make a state-
ment. To make money is our only objective'.s3 Lastly, surrogate licensing-even when 
functioning well-may 'bottleneck' the commercial development of the underlying 
technology. s4 Surrogates may grant exclusive sub licenses that are too broad relative to 
their licensees' contributionsi this blocks others from developing competing technolo-
gies.ss Surrogates may also grant licenses to disease indications or areas of the genome 
far greater than any sub licensee can work at any given time. s6 To be sure, bottleneck-
ing is a serious problem with respect to university licensing as well.s7 But universities 
are frequently more invested in nonexclusive licenses to commercial developers than 
for-profit surrogates.s8 
ETHICAL LICENSING AND ENFORCEMENT 
Most of the commentary on the CRISPR patents has been negative-and, in partic-
ular, the negative side of patenting the products of academic research.s9 But-aside 
from money-there are some significant social positives as well. At their core, patents 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 700. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Mark]. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism-In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. L. 977, 993(2013) 
(noting the conflict between short-term shareholder value and long-term scientific research). 
s2 Id. 
53 KIM MASTERS, KEYS TO THE KINGDOM 103 (2000). 
54 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 700. 
SS Id. 
s6 Id. 
57 See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 271, 
279-80 (2017) (noting deadweight losses with exclusive university licensing) . 
58 Id. at 275. 
59 See eg Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 698; Egelie et al., supra note 18, at 1030-31; Sherkow, supra 
note 2S, at 173. 
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are rights to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention.60 The corollary to 
this axiom is that patents therefore allow their owners to dictate to the rest of the world 
how to use the inventors' technology.61 This power to direct others' research can be har-
nessed for societal good.62 Where the claimed technology raises ethical or social con-
cerns1 patent holders have the right to tell their technologies' users to behave ethically 
and to provide access to downstream inventions.63 In this sense1 patents-when used 
well-can function as a powerful form of private governance.64 
This is certainly the case with CRISPR1 the ethical and social issues of which have 
been explored at length. 65 One potentially problematic use of CRISPRis its use in' gene 
drives', a daisy chain of genetic editing that essentially forces future generations to in-
herit and subsequently pass on only a single variant of a particular gene. 66 The concern, 
as detailed by Kevin Esvelt, is that gene drives, because they are forcibly heritable, be-
come difficult to control once put in place.67 Should later research find negative, un-
intended effects of the particular genetic variant driven through the population, it may 
simply be too late.68 To that end, Esvelt and others have proposed patenting the use 
of CRISPR-based gene drives to1 essentially, prevent others from using the technol-
ogy without rigorous scientific and ethical controls. 69 The legal mechanics of enforcing 
patent protection in this manner leave some gaps that likely need to be addressed. But 
Esvelt's proposal suggests1 at a minimum, that patenting controversial technologies is 
one possible tool to further their ethical use. 
In other cases1 rather than using patents to ethically restrict access to controver-
sial technologies1 patents can be used to ethically promote access to the same. That is, 
patent holders can demand licensees promise that they make their technology available 
to broad segments of society, and on fair terms.7° This is largely the case with Mon-
santo's license from the Broad Institute covering the use of CRISPR-Cas9 for a variety 
of agricultural purposes. That license essentially requires Monsanto to allow its farmer 
customers to save and resew seed from one season to the next, in contrast to some of 
60 See 35 U.S.C. 3 271 (a) (2012) ('[W]hoeverwithout authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term 
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.'). 
61 See Tania Bubela,Jenilee Guebert & Amrita Mishra, Use and Misuse of Material Transfer Agreements: Lessons 
in Proportionality from Research, Repositories, and Litigation, 13 PLoS BIOL. e 1002060 ( 20 IS) (linking patents' 
greater rights to exclude with the lesser right oflimiting the underlying inventions use-typically through ma-
terial transfer agreements). 
62 Christi]. Guerrini et al., The Rise of the Ethical License, 35 NAT. BIOTECH. 22, 22 (2017). 
63 Id. at 23. 
64 Id. at 22 ('By prohibiting uses the patent holder deems unethical, a patent license can function as a tool of 
private governance.'). 
65 See eg Regalado, supra note I. 
66 See Ed Yong, One Man's Plan to Make Sure Gene Editing Doesn't Go Haywire, July II, 2017, ATLANTIC, 
https: / /www.theatlantic.com/ science/ archive/2017 /07 /a-scientists-plan-to-protect-the-world-by-changing 
-how-science-is-done/ 532962/ [https:/ /perma.cc/WSS8-BWC8] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing 
Esvelt' s proposal). 
67 Id. 
68 Kevin M. Esvelt, Strategies for Responsible Gene Editing, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Jan. 25, 2016, https://www. 
project-syndicate.org/ commentary/ crispr-gene-drive-editing-rules-by-kevin-m-esvelt-2016-0 I [https:/ / 
perma.cc/ZP3A-89CX) (accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
69 See Yong, supra note 66. 
70 See Guerrini et al., supra note 62, at 23. 
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Monsanto's past practices.71 Requiring this of Monsanto provides greater access to the 
fruits of CRISPR technology to farmers, who would otherwise be required to purchase 
expensive new seed each year from Monsanto.72 In the therapeutics context, similar li-
cense restrictions could be used, in theory, to require price controls, access plans, or that 
research and development funds be used, in part, to develop treatments for neglected 
diseases.73 
And, perhaps counterintuitively, patents could also be used to ensure research ac-
cess to a variety of technologies. Patent holders can publicly commit to refuse to en-
force their patents against researchers or academic institutions. In the USA, these fre-
quently take the form of 'patent pledges' - 'commitments made voluntarily by patent 
holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their patents'.74 Doing so both 
prevents others from patenting-and suing others-on the same technology, and dis-
suades less ethically minded competitors from entering the field.75 Patent holders can 
also use open licensing systems to researchers interesting in developing and sharing the 
technology for the public good. In the CRISPRcontext, this non-commercial use is me-
diated through a non-profit organization, Add Gene, a company that provides access to 
CRIS PR constructs and plasmids through a standardized Biological Materials Transfer 
Agreement (BMTA). Add Gene's BMTA' s contains patent licenses for academic use of 
the underlying technology.76 
To be sure, these restrictions have the potential for abuse. One scientist's ethi-
cal restriction is another's unethical impediment to research. The Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation (WARF), for example, owns many patents directed to hu-
man embryonic stem cells (hESC), methods of use and propagation and thera-
pies potentially derived from their use.77 But facing public controversy over the 
technology-and a moralistic Congress then threatening to restrict federal funding 
covering the technology-WARF has imposed restrictions on its hESC patent licenses 
concerning their technology's use in connection 'non-human embryos'. 78 These restric-
tions have aroused some ire among the scientific community, many of whom view the 
limitations not as an ethical fence, but an impermissible walling off of secular research 
for religious purposes. 79 
Importantly, too, the overreliance on patents as vehicles promoting the ethical uses 
of technology may crowd out other equally effective-and less restrictive-forms 
of control. Patents, of course, are not the only means of private governance to reign 
in ethically unruly technology. The BioBrick Foundation, a research platform for 
7 1 Id. at 24. 
72 Id. 
73 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, ]. L. & 
BrosCI. 3, 18 (2017) (noting that health care payers have the information and incentives to impose demands 
on drug developers). 
74 Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 Aruz. ST. L.J. 543, 546 (2015). 
75 See Id. 
76 AddGe11e UBMTA, ADDGENE, https://www.addgene.org/ terms/ 1047 / [https://perma.cc/ ZG5K-4YFP] 
(accessed Nov. 131 2017). 
77 John M. Golden, WARF's Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to Re-
search,]. L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 314 (Summer 2010). 
n Id.at 319. 
79 Id. ('In any event, outside researchers do not seem always to have distinguished, or to have been able to dis-
tinguish, between ethical and proprietary motivations for WARF' s restrictions, which a number of researchers 
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'synthetic biology', famously abandoned patents as a tool for ethical governance in fa-
vor of standardized, contractual, materials transfer agreements-namely, the BioBrick 
User Agreement (BUA).80 The BUA itself contains, in essence, ethical 
restrictions-notably, § 5, which prohibits 'intentionally harmful, negligent, or 
unsafe uses'.81 VVhile the enforceability of the agreement is questionable, it stands 
testament to the possibility of private ethical governance of platform technologies 
outside of patent assertion. In any event, the contrast among the WARF hESC patents, 
AddGene's BMTA, and the BUA demonstrates that, like CRISPR itself, patents are 
tools that can be used for good or for ill. At a minimum, ethically responsible patent 
pledges demonstrate the capacity of using patents as a tool for the public good. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In many ways, the ethical, legal, and social issues of CRISPR patenting are idiosyn-
cratic. It is not often that a ground-breaking genetic engineering technology is invented, 
with monumental import to therapy, human reproduction, and social order.82 And 
it is perhaps rarer still that such an important technology becomes the subject of a 
contentious patent dispute among some of the world's highest esteemed research in-
stitutions.Nonetheless-despite claims that the CRISPR.patent dispute is a unique 
event-there are some greater lessons to be learned about the ethical, legal, and social 
implications of intellectual property in research science. 
The first, and perhaps most important for day-to-day scientific practice, is 
that patents-their promises and pitfalls-should not ruin research collaborations. 
Science, and molecular biology in particular, is largely a team sport.83 Researchers 
seeking to make the most significant advances in their fields must increasingly turn 
to others at the fringe of their disciplines for help.84 In biology, this is perhaps best 
exemplified by the recent explosion of collaboration between molecular geneticists and 
computer scientists, the informational yields of which have been tremendous.85 Even 
in the CRISPR context itself, it's worth reiterating that the two warring factions made 
their advances through collaborative efforts, despite patent disputes within research 
groups: Doudna with Charpentier; and Zhang with Luciano Marraffini of Rockefeller 
80 The BioBrick User Agreement, BioBricks Foundation, https: //biobricks.org/ bpa/ users/agreemen t/ 
[https:/ /perma.cc/Y6HD-9WXA] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) [hereinafter BUA]; see also David Singh 
Grewal, Bef ore Peer Production: Infrastructure Gaps and the Architecture of Openness in Synthetic Biology, 20 
STAN. TECH. L. R.Ev. 143, 180- 187 (2017) (exhaustively describing the BUA and its implications). 
SI BUA, supra note 80 . 
82 Although CRJSPR' s magnitude, as a biological tool, is not unique. Recombinant DNA, the discovery ofhESCs, 
and the engineering of monoclonal antibodies have similarly challenged law, science, and ethics when they 
were first announced. See generally GEORGE CHURCH AND ED REGIS, Rf.GENESIS: HOW SYNETHETIC BIOLOGY 
WILL REINVENT NATURE AND OURSELVES (20 12) (discussing each of these technologies and their impact on 
synthetic biology). 
83 Janet D. Stemwedel, The Objectivity Tlzing (Or, Why Science Is a Team Sport), Ser. AM., July 20, 2011, 
https: / / blogs.scien tificamerican.com/ doing-good-science/h ttpblogsscientificamericancomdoing-good-
science20110720the-objectivity-thing-or-why-science-is-a-team-sport/ [https: / / perma.cc/ ENR9-SDYE J 
(accessedNov.13,2017). 
84 See Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. REV. 109 1, 1118- 19 (describing the innovation trend 
to combine widely disparate fields of art). 
85 Minoru Kanehisa & Peer Bork, Bioinformatics in the Post-Sequence Era, 33 NAT. GENET. 305, 305 (2003) (dis-
cussing the rise ofbioinformatics as a scientific discipline); Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai, When Bio-
pharma Meets Software: Bioinformatics at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. L. J. & TECH. 206, 206- 07 (describing the 
Patent protection for CRJSPR • 11 
University.86 CRISPRresearch has now largely become international in scope despite 
a thicket of global and interinstitutional patent issues.87 It is doubtful that further ad-
vances could be made without such teams. Patent incentives should not act as collabo-
rative disincentives. 
Another lesson to be drawn is the potential power of scientists-not just 
lawyers-over the use and abuses of their patents. Researchers often have some sig-
nificant say in how their home institutions can use their patented technology-from 
who should receive a license to the royalty rate and terms set for competitors. 88 
Indeed, academic inventors are frequently the founders or co-owners of spinout com-
panies to whom their institutions farm out patent sub licensing work. 89 Doudna, for ex-
ample, is the co-founder of Caribou Biosciences, the University of California's patent 
surrogate; Charpentier, CRISPR Therapeutics; and Zhang, Editas Medicine.90 Inven-
tor researchers with academic spinouts therefore have some control in how their tech-
nologywill ultimately be used. Scientists with careers otherwise dedicated to the greater 
good should leverage this power; they should engage with and negotiate with their in-
stitutions to responsibly develop the fruits of their efforts. They should not abandon 
these concerns to university administrators or their companies' shareholders. 
Lastly, the ethical, legal, and social implications of the CRISPR patents have some-
thing to say about academic patenting, in general. Currently, a great deal of the aca-
demic literature on IP paints patents with a normative brush-patents are 'good'; 
patents are 'bad'.91 More nuanced, economically sophisticated discussions of these po-
sitions cast them in terms of efficiency.92 But the CRISPR patent controversies teaches 
us that patents, like kitchen knives, are simply tools, without a moral valence sepa-
rate from their users. Patents, like the CRISPR patents, can be used in ways that im-
pede further research.93 Or, they can be used to promote, if not demand, their ethical 
application.94 The patents themselves do not do these things; the outcomes depend 
86 Jon Cohen, How the Battle Lines Over CRISPR Were Drawn, SCIENCE NEWS, Feb. 15, 2017, 
http:/ /www.sciencemag.org/news/2017 / 02/ how-battle-lines-over-crispr-were-drawn [https: / /perma.cc/ 
ZMA5-Y2FU] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (describing the relationships between Doudna and Charpentier as 
well as between Zhang and Marraffini) . 
87 Egelie et al., supra note 18, at 1030- 31. 
88 See Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: Faculty Decisions and Institutional Success at 
Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99, 106 (2001) (describing concerns of academic scientists over 
use of their patented technology); Lynne G . Zucker & Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional Trans-
formation: Patterns of fovention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry, 93 PROC. NAT'L 
ACAD. Sci. USA 709, 709 ( 1996) (examining that faculty input of star scientists is a significant factor affecting 
technology transfer offices' decision to create spinouts). 
89 See Jorge L. Contreras & Charles R. McManis, Catalyzing Technology Development I11rough University Research, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 237 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed. 2016) 
(describing the creation of spinouts). 
90 About Us, CRIS PR THERAPEUTICS, http: / / www.crisprtx.com/ about-us/ scientific-founders-advisors.php 
[https:/ /perma.cc/ T7UB-MKYN) (accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Origins, CARIBOU BIOSCIENCES, 
http://cariboubio.com/origins [https://perma.cc/SMH8-7KHU] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Our Team, 
EDITAS MEDICINE, http:/ /www.editasmedicine.com/ our-team [https: / /perma.cc/UA2W-AUFY] (accessed 
Nov. 13, 2017). 
91 See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1331 (2015) (casting the aca-
demic literature in these normative terms) . 
92 See Id. at 1332- 35 (describing some of the economic literature on the 'patent system', writ large). 
93 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 698. 
94 Guerrini et al., supra note 62, at 23. 
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entirely on who's wielding them. To that end, the CRIS PR patent controversies should 
encourage researchers to think about how, and by whom, their inventions will ulti-
mately be used-both for those seeking to use them for good or for ill. 
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